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WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
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»

Defendant/Appellant
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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Respondent and Cross-Appellant,,

Wendy Marie

Rawlings, by and through counsel, hereby petitions this Court
for a Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals, the Honorable Judges Davidson, Garff, and
Bench, entered on or about April 15, 1988*

Plaintiff

requests

this Court to review the following issues:
1«

Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly apply the

provisions of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
<*UCCJA*>, Section 78-45c-l, et seq- , and the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in TRENT v. TRENT, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987) in
determining if jurisdiction to hear Defendant's custody
modification request in this action properly lies in Utah, or if
the modification request should have been transferred to the
State of Washington as requested by Plaintiff, especially in
light of this Court's guidelines stated in KRAMER v. KRAMER,
P«2d 624 (Utah 1987), regarding custody modification
2*

requests?

Does this case present an important question of

State law, i„e«, how district courts should determine
jurisdiction under the UCCJA,
settled by this Court?

738

which has not, but should be,

REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of t-he Court, of Appeals was published April
.5, 1988, in 80 Utah Advanced Reports 25.

A copy thereof is

.ncluded in "the Appendix.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Wendy Rawlings requests "this review pursuant, "to Rule 43(2)
and (4), Rules of "the Utah Supreme Court., on "the grounds "that,
the Court, of Aptpeals* decision is in conflict wi"th a prior
decision of "the U*tah Supreme Court, and t-he issues on appeal deal
with an important, question of State law, which has not. been, but.
should be r settled by this Court*
STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

Utah UCCJA, 78-45c-l, et seq., with special attention to
Subsection 1(c), Section 3 and Subsections 7(3)(a)-(e>.

(The

Utah UCCJA is reproduced in the Appendix*)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties in the above-entitled action were married on
August IS, 1974 and divorced on May 18, 1982 in the First
District Court of Box Elder County, Utah, by the Honorable Omer
J* Call.

Plaintiff was awarded custody of the five children of

the parties*

Plaintiff was re-married to Mark Rawlings in

September, 1982.
Several Order to Show Cause hearings were held before
Judge Call from the time of the divorce in 1982 to 1984, when
Mrs. Rawlings and the children moved with her husband to the
Seattle, Washington, area in or about June 1, 1984.

Judge Call

modified the visitation portion of the decree at a hearing held
in October, 1984.

Shelter care proceedings were held on or about April,
1985, in the State of Washington pursuant to the emergency
jurisdiction provisions of the Washington UCCJA, which is
similar to the Utah UCCJA.
In or about October, 1985, more than one year after
Plaintiff and the children moved to Washington, Defendant, Mark
Weiner, filed an Order to Show Cause in Utah petitioning for a
modification of the divorce d&cr&&
Weiner custody of the children*

requesting the court to grant

Plaintiff was served with the

Order to Show Cause on or about December 5, 1985, almost one and
one-half years after Plaintiff moved to Washington*
Plaintiff thereafter filed in both Washington and Utah
Motions to Trans^f&T

Jurisdiction of the case to Washington

pursuant to the UCCJA to determine Defendant's custody
modification request*
After communications between Judge Call and Washington
Family Law Commissioner Stephen Gaddis, which were initiated by
the Washington Court, Judge Call denied the request in Utah
transfer jurisdiction, ostensibly because Washington had refused
jurisdiction*

However, it has been indicated by the Washington

court on numerous occassions, including the Order by
Commissioner

Gaddis denying Plaintiff's request for Washington

to asssume jurisdiction, that Washington was at all times ready
to accept jurisdiction of the case*
orders attached in Appendix*)

(See copies of Washington

The only reason Washington

declined jurisdiction was because Judge Call refused to
relinquish jurisdiction*

It appears that Judge Call mistakenly
3

indicated that Washington had declined jurisdiction of its own
accord*
A hearing was then held on Defendant's custody
modification request on May 20, 21, and 22, whereafter Judge
Call amended the Decree granting Defendant joint legal custody,
but leaving physical custody with Plaintiff as stated in the
Decree-

Weiner initially appealed Judge Call's decision to the

Court of Appeals at which time Rawlings cross-appealed solely on
jurisdictional grounds*

Weiner*s appeal was later dismissed for

failure to proceed*
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on the
jurisdictional issue affirming the trial court*

The Court of

Appeals apparently based its decision on the incorrect statement
of Judge Call that Washington had declined jurisdiction and on
the case of TRENT v* TRENT, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah, 1987), wherein
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Utah County District Court's
refusal to transfer jurisdiction to Idaho, where the wife had
lived for approximately five years, of a modification request to
determine visitation rights*

ARGUMENTS
I*
PLAINTIFF BELIEVES THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED THIS CASE CONTRARY TO THE UTAH UCCJA AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S OPINION IN TRENT v. TRENT*

A,

The TRENT case dealt solely with a determination of

visitation rights and not custody.

The divorce decree in the TRENT case was entered in Utah
County on or about January 15, 1980*

Defendant, Mrs. Trent,

who

was living in Idaho at the time, was awarded custody of the
parties six minor children subject to reasonable rights of
visitation by plaintiff*

In May of 1985, plaintiff filed an

order* to show cause requesting the court to enforce the
visitation and to modify the decree to more specifically
visitation.

define

Defendant then requested the court to dismiss the

order to show cause stating that she had lived in Ada County,
Idaho, from July 16, 1979, prior to the divorce, and was served
with the divorce papers while living in Idaho,

She further

stated that she had lived in Idaho from the time of the decree
and that the children had never lived in Utah.

The trial court

refused to dimiss the order to show cause, concluding that since
the issue was limited to visitation in contrast to custody,
Utah forum was not inconvenient.
entered a stipulation regarding

Thereafter,

the parties

visitation.

This Court stated in TRENT:
First, notwithstanding the fact that the CUtah
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction! Act broadly
defines "custody determination* as including
visitation rights, the issue here is not one of
custody in any sense of the word.
Furthermore, no
substantial issue is presented concerning the
visitation to be afforded to Plaintiff.
In fact,
Defendant's affidavit does not frame any contested
issues regarding either Plaintiff's right to visit at
specified times and places or- any adverse effect such
visits might have upon the best interests of the
children.
Under these circumstances, to compel
Plaintiff to seek enforcement of visitation rights in
Idaho does not comport to the obvious purpose and
intent of forum non conveniens espoused in the Act.

5

the

Second, Defendant made no showing of prejudice or
that the interests of the children would best be
served by relinquishing jurisdiction to IdahoDefendant also made no showing that needed evidence
was more readily available in Idaho*
On the
contrary, the court having denied the motion to
dismiss, the parties promptly stipulated the basis
for the court's modification of the decree to permit
specific visitation periods. 735 P.2d at 383.
(Emphasis added)
EL

The instant action deals primarily with custody.

In direct contrast with TRENT, the case at bar dealt
primarily with custody and Defendant's request filed in Utah to
uodify the Decree to grant him custody of
ninor children*

the parties' five

This Court allowed the decision in the TRENT

rase to stand only because that case dealt with minor visitation
rights and did not deal with custody.

Had TRENT dealt with

custody, the opinion clearly suggests that it may very well have
been d<BC±d<ed differently and in favor of Mrs. Trent, which would
also be the decision requested by Mrs. Rawlings in the instant
case.

Therefore, the decision of the Corut of Appeals is in

direct conflict with the decision of this Court in TRENT.

C-

This case is further distinguished from TRENT in

that there are specific contested issues and Plaitniff herein
has made a clear showing of prejudice*

The instant case also clearly shows that the interests of
the children would be better served by relinquishing
jurisdiction to Washington and that it is severely prejudicial
to both Plaintiff and the children to refuse to do so.
6

The

children had been in Washington for approximately two years at
the time the hearing was held in Utah in May, 1986*

The only

connection Utah has with the children is their father,
Defendant) and maternal grandparents*

(the

All other connections are

found in Washington, e* g- friends, neighbors, school teachers,
principals, church leaders, doctors, therapists, psychologists,
etc.

In fact, Mr* Weiner elected, at considerable expense, to

bring the Washington court-appointed psychologist from Seattle
to Utah in order to testify at the hearing*

Plaintiff was

simply unable to call many witnesses that would otherwise have
been available if the matter had been heard in Washington,

D*

The decision of the Court of Appeals is contrary to

Utah law as stated in the Utah UCCJA.

The exercise of jurisdiction by the Utah Court also
seriously contravenes the purposes stated in the Utah UCCJA.
One purp^ose of the UCCJA is to " * * *

assure that litigation

concerning the custody of the child take place ordinarily in the
state with which the child and his family have the closest
connections and where the significant evidence concerning his
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most
readily available and that the courts of this state [should]
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his
family have a closer connection with another state*
73-45C-l(c>*

7

UCA Section

The Weiner children and the Plaintiff certainly have a
nuch closer connection now with Washington than with Utah*

It

is therefore incumbent upon the Utah courts, in order to conform
to the UCCJA, to ±TBTIB±BT-

jurisdiction of the case to Washington

fhere almost all of the evidence exists*

Judge Call may have

Deen familiar with the parties, but was not able to hear all of
the evidence because the evidence could not be brought from
Washington*
It must also be s-tTBSS&d

that this is not the typical

situation envisioned by the drafters of the UCCJA where one
uarty seeks to deprive the other party of certain rights by
noving to another state and requiring the responding party, who
is

still living in the dBCTB& state, to dlend

Defendant initiated this action*

long distance*

He should be held to the

standards defeined in the UCCJA to establish and determine
jurisdiction to modify the custody decree, which require that
this action be heaard in the state with the closest connections,
in this case, the State of Washington*
E*

The decision of the Court of Appeals is also

contrary to the guidelines established by this Corut in custody
nodification actions as stated in KRAMER v* KRAMER*

The necessity of custody modification hearings taking
ulace in the state with the closest connections becomes all the
nore imperative in light of this Court's recent rulings and
iirections regarding custody modification hearings as outlined
in KRAMER v* KRAMER, 738 P*2d 624 <Utah, 1987), wherein this

a

Court has stated that the trial court, when dealing with a
request for modification of an earlier custody order, must first
determine that there has been a substantial change of
circumstances to reopen the custody decree and that

n

.

. .

ordinarily the trial court must focus exclusively on the
parenting ability of the custodial parent and the functioning of
the established custodial relationships, "

738 P.2d at 626

The

trial court can only focus exclusively on the parenting ability
of the custodial parent and the functioning of the custodial
relationship in a situation similar to the instant action when
that hearing is held in the state with the closest connection to
the children and the custodial parent, in this case the State of
Washington.
The trial court in this case simply could not comply with
the guidlines established in KRAMER becuase there was no way to
provide sufficient evidence in Utah when almost all of the
evidence is in Washington*

If Defendant wants to request a

custody -modification, let him go the the forum where the
evidence e::ists and the case can be properly

d^cld^d.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT
QUESTION OF STATE LAW, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN,
BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT.

Since TRENT did not deal with modification of a custody
order pursuant to the UCCJA, the instant case is a case of first
impression in Utah.

As currently stated by the Court of
9
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it had considered the jurisdictional requirements of the Utah
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In determining if the Alaska Superior Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3 of the UCCJA,
similar to the Utah UCCJA except for the

(which is

"significant

connection" requirement), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that
since the wife had recently moved from the State of Washington
and was currently residing in California at the time the
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state", the child having resided in California for less than si:c
months, no

other state had jurisdiction at the relevant time.
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trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection

<a)<4) of

Section 3 of the UCCJA because no other state appeared to have
jurisdiction.
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The opinion of -the Alaska Supreme Court, is veil reasoned,
complies with the purpose and provisions of the UCCJA, and
further appears to be in harmony with this Court's decisions
TRENT and KRAMER.

in

Furthermore, this court certainly did not

intend in the TRENT case that Utah would always retain
jurisdiction as long as one

of the parties resided in Utah.

Therefore, this court should review the instant case in an
effort to establish guidelines in future cases and for members
of the bar when dealing with modification of

a custody order in

a Utah divorce decree when the custodial parent no longer
resides in Utah.

CONCLUSION

It appears quite clearly that the decision of the Court of
Appeals in this matter is in conflict of the decision of this
Court in TRENT and the guidelines established in KRAMER.

It

also appears that the decision of the Appeals Court may be in
conflict with the purpose and intent of the UCCJA*

These are

important legal issues which should be determined and clarified
by this Court.
Therefore, this Court should grant Plaintiff's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

13
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APR 18 1988
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Wendy Marie Christensen Rawlings,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Mark Douglas Weiner,

Case No. 860274-CA

Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent.

FILED

Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Bench.-

DAVIDSON, Judge:

Tin/othy M Snea
rterk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Plaintiff Wendy Rawlings (Rawlings) appeals from the
district court's modification of her divorce decree, claiming
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree
because of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),
in effect in both Utah and Washington. We affirm.
Defendant Mark Weiner (Weiner) and Rawlings were married
August 16, 1974, in Manti, Utah. The parties had five children
as issue of their marriage. The parties were divorced on May
18, 1982, by the Honorable Omer J. Call of the First District
Court of Box Elder County, Utah. The original decree was later
amended on September 27, 1982, by Judge Call. Rawlings was
awarded custody of the parties' five children while Weiner was
awarded carefully enunciated visitation rights with the minor
children. In December 1982, Rawlings remarried.
From 1982 to 1984 Weiner initiated several proceedings to
enforce the visitation order in the divorce decree, and each
time the judge ordered the parties to comply with the order.1
1. All hearings were before Judge Call. The orders on the
order to show cause enumerated here dealt exclusively with
compliance of visitation rights. The orders by Judge Call were:
November 17, 1982; May 16, 1983; February 16, 1984; May 29, 1984

In June 1984, Rawlings sent a letter to Weiner informing
him that she and the children had moved to Mthe Des Moines area"
and could be reached at a Utah post office box, Rawlings moved
to Washington in June of 1984.2 During the summer of 1984,
Weiner initiated several additional proceedings in an attempt tc
locate his children.3
In October 1984, another hearing was held and the court
found that Rawlings1 move constituted a substantial change in
circumstances allowing modification of the visitation provisions
in the divorce decree.
In April 1985, a shelter care hearing was held in
Washington, pursuant to emergency jurisdiction provided for in
the Washington UCCJA, to determine allegations of child abuse
made by Rawlings against Weiner. Commissioner Gaddis of the
Washington court noted that the Washington court orders were
temporary and any permanent adjudication or realignment of the
parties had to come from Utah, until the Utah court declined
jurisdiction.
In October 1985, Weiner filed an order to show cause in
Utah. In November 1985, Rawlings petitioned for transfer of
jurisdiction from Utah to Washington. Pursuant to Rawlings'
transfer request, Commissioner Gaddis contacted the court in
Utah and after discussion with Judge Call declined to accept
jurisdiction in Washington. Commissioner Gaddis urged the Utah
court to retain jurisdiction to enforce or modify custody and
visitation orders.
On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a statement and
order and certified the matters of disqualification and
jurisdiction to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First Distric
Court of Utah for determination. Judge Christoffersen denied
Rawlings' motion to disqualify Judge Call, denied the Motion to
Change Jurisdiction, and set a hearing date in May 1986, for thi
order to show cause. On October 21, 1986, the findings of fact
conclusions of law, and order on the order to show cause were
entered by the court. The court found Rawlings in contempt for
continuing to use "Rawlings" as the children's last name after
being ordered not to do so, modified the visitation order and
ordered that the parties have joint custody of the children,
with Rawlings maintaining physical custody.
2. The "Des Moines area" referred to in the letter turned out
to be a suburb of Seattle, Washington.
3. Weiner's continued attempt to locate his children resulted
in additional orders by Judge Cal1 on July 26, 1984 and August
8, 1984.
860274-CA

Weiner timely appealed the October 21, 1986 order.
Rawlings cross-appealed on grounds that the First District Court
lacked jurisdiction. Weiner1s appeal was dismissed for lack of
prosecution by order of this Court on June 9, 1987.
Before addressing the issue of jurisdiction it is important
to note that there is no transcript of the May 1986 hearing.
Rawlings refers to continuing objections to jurisdiction made at
the May hearing. There is no record of these objections as
Rawlings requested no transcript. As held in Fackrell v.
Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987):
Appellate review of factual matters can be
meaningful/ orderly, and intelligent only
in juxtaposition to a record by which
lower courts' rulings and decisions on
disputes can be measured. In this case
without a transcript no such record was
available, and therefore no measurement of
the district court's action can be made as
urged upon us by defendant.
Id. at 1319-20 (quoting Sawvers v. Sawvers, 558 P.2d 607, 608-09
(Utah 1976)). Without "adequate citations to the record, the
judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct."
Fackrell, 740 P.2d at 1319.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1987) provides:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for
the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and
their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
This statute establishes continuing jurisdiction in the First
District Court of Box Elder County as the court granting the
decree of divorce. Rawlings argues that notwithstanding the
continuing jurisdiction, under the Utah UCCJA, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-45C-1 to 26 (1987), this state is an inconvenient forum.
Section 78-45c-3(l) states:
A court of this state which is competent
to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in
any of the following paragraphs are met:
860274-CA
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(a)

This state (i) is the home state of
the chi^ld at the time of commencement
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been
the child's home state within six
months before commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent
from this state because of his
removal or retention by a person
claiming his custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person
acting as parent continues to live in
this state;

(b)

It is in the best interest of the
child that a court of this state
assume jurisdiction because (i) the
child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this
state, and (ii) there is available in
this state substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships;

(c)

The child is physically present in
this state and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in
an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse
or is otherwise neglected or
dependent; or

(d)

(i) It appears that no other state
would have jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in
accordance with Paragraphs (a), (b),
or (c), or another state has declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child, and (ii) it is
in the best interest of the child
that this court assume jurisdiction.

Section 78-45c-3(3) states:
Physical presence of the child, while
desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
860274-CA
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Section 78-45c-7(3) states:
In determining if it is an
inconvenient forum, the court shall
consider if it is in the interest of
the child that another state assume
jurisdiction. For this purpose it
may take into account the following
factors/ among others:
(a)

if another state is or recently was
the child's home state;

(b)

if another state has a closer
connection with the child and his
family or with the child and one or
more of the contestants;

(c)

if substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships is more readily
available in another state;

(d)

if the parties have agreed on another
forum which is no less appropriate;
and

(e)

if the exercise of jurisdiction by a
court of this state would contravene
any of the purposes stated in
§ 78-45C-1.

The UCCJA does not mandate loss of jurisdiction to the
original state in all cases. Only if Utah chooses to
relinquish jurisdiction, based on the best interests of the
children, will such jurisdiction transfer.4 In Trent v.
Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's authority under the Utah UCCJA in
declining to relinquish jurisdiction to Idaho. In Trent the
4. It may be argued that jurisdiction may be obtained through
the emergency provision in section 78-45c-3(l)(c) as was done in
this case. However, accepting such jurisdiction on an emergency
basis does not give permanent jurisdiction. The court is still
required to contact the original state court to determine which
court is most convenient and best serves the interests of the
children and the parties.
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children had neither lived in nor had any contacts with the
State of Utah, unlike the children in this case. While Trent
dealt exclusively with enforcement of visitation, it makes
clear that the UCCJA is not mandatory.
The facts show that Washington specifically declined to
exercise jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present
involvement with the matter. The judge in Utah and
commissioner in Washington conferred and determined that Utah
was the more appropriate forum and that Utah would continue to
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and
visitation of the parties' children. This is precisely the
position described in section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i).5 We hold
that the First District Court appropriately retained
jurisdiction under the Utah UCCJA to make any determinations
regarding custody, visitation or other matters relevant to the
children.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

BENCH, Judge:

(Concurring)

For me, the instant case presents a very narrow question:
How does a state's continuing jurisdiction in a divorce case
mesh with foreign jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979)? I believe the

5. Section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i) is the same version as used by
Judge Call in December 1985.
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question is answered by section 14(1) of UCCJA,1 which was
not mentioned by the majority but provides as follows:
If a court of another state has made
a custody decree, a court of this state
shall not modify that decree unless (a) it
appears to the court of this state that
the court which rendered the decree does
not now have jurisdiction under
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially
in accordance with this act or has
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify
the decree and (b) the court of this state
has jurisdiction.
The Commissioner's note to section 14 explains the
circumstances under which jurisdiction would shift:
Courts which render a custody decree
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to
modify the decree under local law. Courts
in other states have in the past often
assumed jurisdiction to modify the
out-of-state decree themselves without
regard to the preexisting jurisdiction of
the other state. In order to achieve
greater stability of custody arrangements
and avoid forum shopping, subsection (a)
declares that other states will defer to
the continuing jurisdiction of the court
of another state as long as that state has
jurisdiction under the standards of this
Act. In other words, all petitions for
modification are to be addressed to the
prior state if that state has sufficient
contact with the case to satisfy section
3. The fact that the court had previously
considered the case may be one factor
favoring its continued jurisdiction. If,
however, all the persons involved have
moved away or the contact with the state
has otherwise become slight, modification
jurisdiction would shift elsewhere.
1. In Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987); in
Washington, RCWA 26.27.140 (1986).
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9 U.L.A. at 154 (citation omitted).
The Reporter for the Special Committee preparing the UCCJA
was even more specific when she noted the following:
A typical example is the case of the
couple who are divorced in state A, their
matrimonial home state, and whose children
are awarded to the wife, subject to
visitation rights of the husband. Wife
and children move to state B, with or
without permission of the court to remove
the children. State A has continuing
jurisdiction and the courts in state B may
not hear the wife's petition to make her
the sole custodian, eliminate visitation
rights, or make any other modification of
the decree, even though state B has in the
meantime become the Hhome state- under
section 3. The jurisdiction of state A
continues and is exclusive as long as the
husband lives in state A unless he loses
contact with the children, for example, by
not using his visitation privileges for
three years.
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws,
22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969) (quoted in State ex rel.
Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Tenn. 1985)).
Under the facts of this case, Utah's jurisdiction over
custody issues was primary and Washington's jurisdiction was
secondary. The parties were divorced in Utah. Rawlings
subsequently moved to Washington, taking the children with
her. Weiner remained in Utah, and continually sought
enforcement of his visitation rights under the Utah decree. At
Rawlings' request, Washington took emergency jurisdiction under
UCCJA. On discovering that Utah had continuing jurisdiction
over custody, Washington declined any further jurisdiction
under section 14(1). That was precisely what should have
happened under UCCJA. Because Utah had primary jurisdiction
over custody of the children, I concur in affirming the
judgment of the trial court.

Russell W. Bench, Ju^fge^^^1-^
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effect, the order will not take effect until a determination is made at the hearThe administrative law judge shall remind the payee of visitation rights of
payor and under proper circumstances the administrative law judge may make
»ort payments conditional upon the child's custodian making the child available
the exercise of visitation rights. Hearings shall be granted and conducted in
rdance with section 78-45b-6.
the department's application for an order to withhold and deliver is granted,
py of the order will be served upon the obligor's employer or payer of earnings
ertified mail, return receipt requested.
the event there is in the possession of any employer or payer of earnings any
lings subject to the department's order to withhold and deliver, such earnings
1 be withheld immediately upon receipt of the order and shall be forwarded
le department or other designee.
) Every person, firm, corporation, association, political subdivision, or departt of the state shall honor according to its terms, the department's order to
lhold and deliver, or a duly executed assignment of earnings whether executed
ntarily or pursuant to an order which is presented by the department as a plan
atisfy or retire a support debt or obligation. This requirement to honor the
irtment's order to withhold and deliver the assignment of earnings and the
gnment of earnings itself shall be applicable whether said earnings are to be
I presently or in the future and shall continue in force and effect until released
writing by the department. Any order or assignment made pursuant to this subion shall have the same priority against the obligor as a claim for taxes. Payit of moneys pursuant to an order or assignment of earnings presented by the
artment shall serve as full acquittance under any contract of employment, and
state shall defend the employer and hold him harmless for any action taken
3uant to the assignment of earnings. The department shall be released from
ility for improper receipt of moneys under an assignment of earnings upon
irn of any moneys so received.
I) No employer may discharge or prejudice any employee by reason of the fact.
t his earnings have been subjected to support lien, wage assignment or garnishit for any indebtedness under this act. This subsection shall not preclude termiion of an obligor who is an employee for other causes.
>) Should any person discharge an employee in violation of subsection (4), that
son shall be liable to the employee for such damages as he may suffer, together
h costs, interest, and attorneys' fees, or a maximum of $1,000, whichever is
er.
>) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual
any work pay period which may be subjected to a support lien or garnishment
mforce payment of a judgment arising out of failure to support dependent chiln may not exceed 50% of his disposable earnings for the work pay period.
0 Whenever a support lien or garnishment is served upon any person, asserta support debt against earnings and there is in the possession of such person
such earnings, 50% of the disposable earnings shall be disbursed to the debtor
jther such earnings are paid, or are to be paid weekly, monthly or at other reguintervals and whether there be due the debtor earnings for one week or for
Dnger period. The support lien or garnishment shall continue to operate and
uire said person to withhold the nonexempt portion of earnings at each succeedearnings disbursement interval until released in writing from the department.
istory: C. 1953, 78-45b-13, enacted by L. allow the department to issue orders requir>, ch. 96, §13; L. 1977, ch. 145, §9; 1982, ing the withholding and delivery of earnings
of a responsible parent. For prior version, see
32, § 2.
parent volume.
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C H A P T E R 45c
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Purposes — Construction.
Definitions.
Rases of jurisdiction in this state.
Persons to he notified and heard.
Service of notice outside state — Proof of service — Submission to jurisdiction.
Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction not exercised — Inquiry to other
state — Information exchange — Stay of proceeding on notice of another proceeding.
Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum — Factors in determination — Communication with other court — Awarding costs.
Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction — Notice to another
jurisdiction — Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to return child
— Awarding costs.
Information as to custody of child and litigation concerning required in pleadings
— Verification — Continuing duty to inform court.
Joinder of persons having custody or claiming custody or visitation rights.
Ordering party to appear — Enforcement -— Out-of-state party — Travel expense.
Parties bound hy custody decree — Conclusive unless modified.
Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees.
Modification of foreign decree — Prerequisites — Factors considered.
Filing foreign decree — Effect — Enforcement — Award of expenses.
Registry maintained hy clerk of court — Documents entered.
Certified copies of decrees furnished by clerk of court.
Taking testimony of persons in other states.
Request to court of another state to take evidence, to make studies or to order
appearance of party — Payment of costs.
Taking evidence for use in court of another state — Ordering appearance in
another state — Enforcement — Costs.
Preservation of records of proceedings — Furnishing copies to other state courts.
Requesting court records from another state.
Foreign countries — Application of general policies.
Priority on court calendar.
Notices — Orders to appear — Manner of service.
Short title.

78-45c-l. P u r p o s e s — Construction. (1) The general purposes of this act are
to:
(a) Avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other states in
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children
from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
l^%f)^ Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end t h a t a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest
of the child;
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily
in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal
relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the
exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with
another state;
(d) Discourage continuing c o n t r o v e r s i e s over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;

) Promote ana expand tne excnange or inrormation anu oiner lorms ui mutual
stance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with
same child; and
I To make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
) This title shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this
ion.
story:

L. 1980, ch. 41, § 1.

; of Act.
l act relating to child custody; providing
mactment of the Uniform Child Custody
sdiction Act; providing procedures for
determination of child custody issues

when the parties live in different jurisdictions; providing for recognition of child cust 0 ( |y determinations made by other jurisdictions; providing for enforcement of child custody d e t e r m i n a t i o n s and minimizing the
necessity for repetitious litigation. -~ Laws
1980, ch. 41.

$-45c-2. Definitions. As used in this act:
) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to cusr or visitation rights with respect to a child;
:) "Custody d e t e r m i n a t i o n " means a court decision and court orders and
ructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation rights; it does
include a decision relating to child support or any other monetary obligation
ny person;
I) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a custody determination
ne of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of marriage, or legal sepaon, and includes child neglect and dependency proceedings;
L) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determination contained in
idicial decree or order made in a custody proceeding, and includes an initial
*ee and a modification decree;
>) "Home state" means the state in which the child immediately preceding the
B involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for
east six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months
the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
iods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part
he six-month or other period;
i) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning a particular child;
r
) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which modifies or replaces a
»r decree, whether made by the court which rendered the prior decree or by
ther court;
\) "Physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child;
I) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has
sical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by the court
laims a right to custody; and
0) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the
imonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
istory:

L. 1980, ch. 41, §2.

S-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. (1) A court of this state which
ompetent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child cus? determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth
ny of the following paragraphs are met:
t) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement
he proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within six months before
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(Dj it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is available in
this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) The child is physically present in this state and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has
been subjected to or threatened with m i s t r e a t m e n t or abuse or is otherwise
neglected or dependent; or
\
(d) (i) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or another state
has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground t h a t this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (1), physical presence in
this state of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a p r e r e q u i s i t e for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 3.
78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and
act, reasonable notice and opportunity to
any parent whose parental rights have
person who has physical custody of the
this state, notice and opportunity to be
78-45c-5.

heard. Before making a decree under this
be heard shall be given to the contestants,
not been previously terminated, and any
child. If any of these persons is outside
heard shall be given pursuant to section

History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 4.
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state — Proof of service — Submission
to jurisdiction. (1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person
outside this state shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual
notice, and may be made in any of the following ways:
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the manner prescribed for service
of process within this state;
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is
made for service of process in that place in an action in any of its courts of general
jurisdiction;
(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting
a receipt; or
(d) As directed by the court (including publication, if other means of notification are ineffective).
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, delivered, or last published
at least 10 days before any hearing in this state.
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual
who made the service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the
order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the
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is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the
je or other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
y: L. 1980, ch. 41, §5.
c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction not exercised —
/ to other state — Information e x c h a n g e — S t a y of p r o c e e d i n g on
of another p r o c e e d i n g . (1) A court of this state shall not exercise its
lion under this act if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerncustody of the child was pending in a court of another state exercising
:tion substantially in conformity with this act, unless the proceeding is
by the court of the other state because this state is a more appropriate
or for other reasons.
Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine
adings and other information supplied by the parties under section 78-45c-10
all consult the child custody registry established under section 78-45c-16 cony the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child in other states. If
art has reason to believe t h a t proceedings may be pending in another state
1 direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or other appropriate offithe other state.
If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding t h a t a proceedncerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the
assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the
in which the other proceeding is pending to the end t h a t the issue may be
ed in the more appropriate forum and t h a t information be exchanged in
iance with sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of this state has
a custody decree before being informed of a pending proceeding in a court
other state it shall immediately inform t h a t court of the fact. If the court
ormed t h a t a proceeding was commenced in another state after it assumed
liction it shall likewise inform the other court to the end t h a t the issues may
igated in the more appropriate forum.

(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any
of the purposes stated in section 78-45c-l.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may
communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring t h a t jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and t h a t a forum will be available to the parties.
(5) If the court finds t h a t it is an inconvenient forum and t h a t a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it
may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions Nwhich may be
just and proper, including the condition t h a t a moving party stipulate his consent
and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum,
\
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody
determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while
retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
(7) If it appears to the court t h a t it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may
require the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs
of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made
to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall
inform the court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, shall
transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate official
for forwarding to the appropriate court.
(9) Any communication received from another state informing this state of a
finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate
forum shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming
jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the original court of this fact.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 7.

tory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 6.
45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum — Facin determination — Communication with other court — Awarding costs.
A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or modificadecree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree
finds t h a t it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under
ircumstances of the case and t h a t a court of another state is a more appropriorum.
i A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion
pon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the
) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if
in the interest of the child t h a t another state assume jurisdiction. For this
>ose it may take into account the following factors, among others:
) If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or
i the child and one or more of the contestants;
) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, proteci ~-i~*:~„oV,;™c IQ more readilv available in another state;

78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing j u r i s d i c t i o n —
Notice to another jurisdiction — Ordering petitioner to appear in other court
or to return child — Awarding costs. (1) If the petitioner for an initial decree
has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar
reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes
of adjudication of custody if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without
consent of the person entitled to custody has improperly removed the child from
the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained
the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If
the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state
the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under
the circumstances.
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an initial
custody decree pursuant to subsection (1), the court shall notify the parent or other
appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in
the other state. If a request to t h a t effect is received from the other state, the
court shall order the petitioner to appear with the child in a custody proceeding
:~~m„<r„A ;« f^0 Mhar Qtatft in accordance with section 78~45c-20. If no such request
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mother state pursuant to subsection (2) or pursuant to section 78-45c-14, the
rt shall notify the person who has legal custody under the decree of the other
te and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other state
may order the petitioner to return the child to the person who has legal cusy. If it appears that the order will be ineffective and the legal custodian is ready
receive the child within a period of a few days, the court may place the child
i foster care home for such period, pending return of the child to the legal custon. At the same time, the court shall advise the petitioner that any petition for
jification of custody must be directed to the appropriate court of the other state
ich has continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines jurisdic1, to a court in a state which has jurisdiction pursuant to section 78-45c-3.
5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may
rge the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including attorney's
5 and the cost of returning the child to another state.

tody of the child the court may order t h a t he appear personally with the child
If the party who is ordered to appear with the child cannot be served or fails t(
obey the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue i
warrant of arrest against such party to secure his appearance with the child.
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is outside
this state with or without the child the court may order t h a t the notice given undei
section 78-45c-5 include a statement directing t h a t party to appear personally with
or without the child and declaring t h a t failure to appear may result in a decisior
adverse to that party.
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appeal
under subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before the court with or without the child, the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of the courl
travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of the child ii
this is just and proper under the circumstances.
History:

[istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 8.
8-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and l i t i g a t i o n concerning
[uired in pleadings — Verification — Continuing duty to inform court.
Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading or in an affidavit
ached to t h a t pleading shall give information under oath as to the child's
sent address, the places where the child has lived within the last five years,
I the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived
ing that period. In this pleading or affidavit every party shall further declare
ler oath as to each of the following whether:
a) He has participated, as a party, witness, or in any other capacity, in any
er litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or any other state;
b) He has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending
i court of this or any other state; and
c) He knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who has physical
tody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect to
child.
2) If the d e c l a r a t i o n as to any of the above items is in the affirmative the
larant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court.
$ court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information
nished and as to other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disition of the case.
3) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody proding concerning the child in this or any other state of which he obtained infortion during this proceeding.
istory: L. 1980, ch. 41. §9.
8-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or claiming custody or visitai rights. If the court learns from information furnished by the parties pursuant
section 78-45c-9 or from other sources that a person not a party to the custody
ceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation
its with respect to the child, it shall order that person to be joined as a party
I to be duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of his joinder as
arty. If the person joined as a party is outside this state he shall be served
h process or otherwise notified in accordance with section 78-45c-5.
istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 10.
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L. 1980, ch. 41, §11.

78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree — Conclusive unless modified,
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction under
section 78-45c-3, binds all parties who have been served in this state or notified
in accordance with section 78-45c-5 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties
the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as
to the custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified
pursuant to law, including the provisions of this act.
History:

L. 1980, ch. 41, §12.

78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees. The courts of
this state shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court
of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this act or which was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so long as this decree has
not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar
to those of this act.
History:

L. 1980, ch. 41, §13.

78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree — Prerequisites — Factors considered. (1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this
state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state
that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or has declined
to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of this state has jurisdiction.
(2) If a court of this state is a u t h o r i z e d under subsection (1) and section
78-45c-8 to modify a custody decree of another state it shall give due consideration
to the transcript of the record and other documents of all previous proceedings
submitted to it in accordance with section 78-45c-22.
History:

L. 1980, ch. 41, § 14.

78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree — Effect — E n f o r c e m e n t — Award of
expenses. (1) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed
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he office of the clerk of any district court of this state. The clerk shall treat
decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the district court of this
e. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in like
iner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state.
!) A person violating a custody decree of another state which makes it neces1 to enforce the decree in this state may be required to pay necessary travel
other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the party entitled to the
,ody or his witnesses.
istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 15.
8-45c-16. Registry m a i n t a i n e d by clerk of c o u r t — D o c u m e n t s entered.
clerk of each district court shall maintain a registry in which he shall enter
of the following:
L) Certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing;
I) Communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other states;
3) Communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a court of
>ther state; and
1) Other c o m m u n i c a t i o n s or documents concerning custody proceedings in
ither state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this state or the dispoon to be made by it in a custody proceeding.
1

[istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 16.
8-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished by c l e r k of c o u r t . The clerk
a district court of this state, at the request of the court of another state or
the request of any person who is affected by or has a legitimate interest in a
tody decree, shall certify and forward a copy of the decree to that court or peri.

[istory: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 17.

of the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be assessed agains
another party or will otherwise be paid.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 19.
78-45c-20. T a k i n g evidence for use in c o u r t of a n o t h e r s t a t e — Orderinj
a p p e a r a n c e in a n o t h e r state — Enforcement — Costs. (1) Upon request of th
court of another state the courts of this state which are competent to hear custod;
matters may order a person in this state to appear at a hearing to adduce evidenc
or to produce or give evidence under other procedures available in this state. I
certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing or the evidence other
wise adduced shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court to the requesting court.
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give his testimony or statemen
in this state for use in a custody proceeding outside this state.
(3) Upon request of the court of another state a competent coqrt of this stat
may order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a custod
proceeding in another state. The court may condition compliance wi^h the reques
upon assurance by the other state that travel and other necessary expenses wi
be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has physical custody, of the chil
cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it appears the order will be ineffec
tive, the court may issue a warrant of arrest against such person to secure hi
appearance with the child in the other state.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §20.
78-45c-21. P r e s e r v a t i o n of records of proceedings — F u r n i s h i n g copies t
o t h e r s t a t e c o u r t s . In any custody proceeding in this state the court shall preserv
the pleadings, orders and decrees, any record t h a t has been made of its hearing
social studies, and other pertinent documents until the child reaches 18 years (
age. Upon appropriate request of the court of another state the court shall forwar
to the other court certified copies of any or all of such documents.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §21.

8-45c-18. T a k i n g testimony of persons in o t h e r states. In addition to other
icedural devices available to a party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian
litem or other representative of the child may adduce testimony of witnesses,
luding parties and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state. The
irt on its own motion may direct that the testimony of a person be taken in
)ther state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which
\ testimony shall be taken.
listory: L. 1980, ch. 41, §18.
f8-45c-19. Request to c o u r t of a n o t h e r s t a t e to t a k e e v i d e n c e , to make
idies or to o r d e r a p p e a r a n c e of p a r t y — P a y m e n t of costs. (1) A court of
s state may request the appropriate court of another state to hold a hearing
adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give evidence under other proceres of t h a t state, or to have social studies made with respect to the custody of
:hild involved in proceedings pending in the court of this state; and to forward
the court of this state certified copies of the transcript of the record of the hearl, the evidence otherwise adduced, or any social studies prepared in compliance
th the request. The cost of the services may be assessed against the parties.
2) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state

78-45c-22. Requesting c o u r t records from a n o t h e r s t a t e . If a custody decrt
has been rendered in another state concerning a child involved in a custody pr<
ceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of this state upon taking jurisdii
tion of the case shall request of the court of the other state a certified copy <
the transcript of any court record and other documents mentioned in sectio
78-45c-21.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, §22.
78-45c-23. Foreign countries — Application of g e n e r a l policies. The gener,
policies of this act extend to the international area. The provisions of this act rela
ing to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other states app'
to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to cu
tody rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable notice ar
opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons.
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 23.
78-45c-24. P r i o r i t y on c o u r t calendar. Upon the request of a party to a cu
tody proceeding which raises a question of existence or exercise of jurisdictk
„r,r}ar. th\a 0M fho oudo ahuU hp ir'wpn calendar orioritv and handled expeditiously.

le court or a party to the action upon order of the court.
(2) Orders of the court for p a r t i e s or persons to appear before the court in
:cordance with the terms of this act shall include legal and sufficient service of
•ocess in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise
•dered for good cause shown.

S h o r t title. This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child Cus-

dy Jurisdiction Act."
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 26.
ffective Date.
Section 27 of Laws 1980, ch. 41 provided:
'his act shall take effect on July 1, 1980."
PARTV
JURORS
hapter
5-46. J u r y Selection a n d Service Act.

C H A P T E R 46
JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT
ction
-46-1.
-46-2.
-46-3.
-46-4.
-46-5.
-46-6.
•46-7.
46-8.
46-9.
46-10.
46-11.
46-12.
46-13.
46-14.
46-15.
46-16.
46-17,
46-18.
46-19.
46-20.

78-46-1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "J
Selection and Service Act."
History: C. 1953, 78-46-1, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 130, § 1.

History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 25.
78-45c-26.

tuting grand jury.
78-46-23. Court administrator's duties and responsibilities.

Short title.
Jurors selected from random cross section — Opportunity and obligation to serve.
Discrimination prohibited.
Definitions.
Number of trial jurors.
Alternate trial jurors — Selection — Duties and function.
Persons competent to serve as jurors.
Determination on juror qualification — Persons not competent to serve as jurors.
Jury commissioners — Appointment — Term — Qualifications •— Compensation
— Vacancy.
Master list maintained by jury commission — Public examination — Lists used
in compiling master list available to jury commission.
Master jury wheel — Selection of names to put in jury wheel.
Drawing prospective juror names from master wheel — Juror qualification form
— Content — Completion — Penalties for failure to complete or misrepresentation — Joint jury wheel for court authorized.
Drawing juror panels — Notice to jurors — Procedure when shortage of jurors
drawn — Public inspection of names drawn and content of qualification forms
— Exception.
Qualified prospective jurors not exempt from jury service.
Excuse from jury service.
Jury not selected in conformity with act — Procedure to challenge — Relief available.
Preservation of records and papers.
Compensation and travel expenses of jurors.
Limitations on jury service.
Penalties for failure to appear or complete jury service.
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Title of Act.
An act repealing and reenacting cha]
46, title 78, Utah Code Annotated 1953, re
Compiler s Notes.
- n g t Q j u r i e s ; p r o v i d i n g t h e m a n n e r in wl
Laws 1979, ch. 130, § 1 repealed old sections jurors are called, establishing jury comr
78-46-1 to 78-46-33 (R.S. 1898, §§ 1291 to 1316, s i o n ers and defining their duties; provic
1318 to 1323; L. 1905, ch. 15, § 1; 1905, ch. 102, j u r 0 r qualifications, exemptions and pr<
§ 1; C.L. 1907, §§ 1291 to 1316, 1318 to 1323; c i ur es for challenging jury selection methi
CL. 1917, §§3591 to 3616, 3618 to 3623; L. providing the method for selecting gr
1925, ch. 18, § 1; 1925, ch. 19, § 1; 1929, ch. 87, j u r i e s ; establishing sanctions for failure
§ 1; U.S. 1933, 40-0-1 to 40-0-33; L. 1933, ch. comply with requirements of the act; pre
36, §1; 1933 (2nd S.S.), ch. 11, §1; C. 1943, j n g sanctions and penalties for employ
40-0-1 to 40-0-33; L. 1947, ch. 65, §§ 1, 2; 1949, w n o discharge employees summoned for j
ch. 59, § 1; 1949, ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 209, § 4; service; and providing a severability clai
1967, ch. 221, §1; 1971, ch. 44, §2; 1971 (1st _ L a ws 1979, ch. 130.
S S.), ch. 8, § 1; 1977, ch. 77, §§ 70 to 73; 1977,
ch. 140, §4; 1977, ch. 144, §§ 1, 2), relating to Law Reviews.
the selection and qualifications of jurors, and
Utah Legislative Survey — 1979, 1980 U
enacted new sections 78-46-1 to 78-46-23.
LMtev. 155.
78-46-2. J u r o r s selected from r a n d o m cross section — O p p o r t u n i t y a
obligation to serve. It is the policy of this state t h a t persons selected for ji
service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of i
area served by the court, and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity
accordance with this act to be considered for jury service and have the obligat
to serve as jurors when summoned for t h a t purpose.
History: C. 1953, 78-46-2, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 130, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
p o r repeal and re-enactment of this s
tion, see Compiler's Notes under 78-16-1.

78-46-3. Discrimination prohibited. A citizen shall not be excluded or exen
from jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ei
nomic status.
History: C. 1953, 78-46-3, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 130, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
p o r repeal and re-enactment of this s
tion, see Compiler's Notes under 78-46-1.

78-46-4. Definitions. (1) "Jury" means a body of persons temporarily select
from the citizens of a particular county invested with power to present and ind
a person for a public offense, or to try a question of fact.
(2) "Grand jury" means a body of seven persons selected from the citizens
a particular county before a court of competent jurisdiction and sworn to inqui
into public offenses committed or triable within the county.
(3) "Trial jury" means a body of persons selected from the citizens of a partic
lar county before a court or offices of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to try a
determine by verdict a question of fact.
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IN THE^SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGS,
Petitioner,
NO. 85-3-04844-3
v,

ORDER DECLINING
JURISDICTION

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Respondent,

Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and
communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly
and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to
the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporaneous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the
children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction
therein; the court having further communicated with the appropriate judge of Bex Elder County District Court; now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court
finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject to
this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter

jurisdiction of the Box Elder County District Court of the State
of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously,exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceedings; and that one of the named parties, father of the children,

A<?

continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon commur
tion with said court it has elected and determined to cont
exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Chi
Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that
Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody
visitation of the parties 1 children, the parties not havinc
agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington a
there being no emergency justifying intervention in the mat
by Washington Courts; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings c
cerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed

unt

further order of the court or until an appropriate motion fi
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and
proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of s
orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder Cour
District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisio
the UCCJA.

Dated and signed in open this / -^ of January, 1986

Stephen Caddis
STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIC
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THIS MATTER having come on regularly to be heard beiore the
|| undersigned Court Commissioner upon the Motion of Petitioner, and
16
!; the Petitioner appearing personally and by her a"crney, Ralph
'i Thompson, Jr., ?.S. of Sonkin, Thompson & Klein, and "the
• Respondent aooearing/not aooearing, and the Court having
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